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Abstract
Scoring rules serve to quantify predictive performance. A scoring rule
is proper if truth telling is an optimal strategy in expectation. Subject to
customary regularity conditions, every scoring rule can be made proper, by
applying a special case of the Bayes act construction studied by Gru¨nwald
and Dawid (2004) and Dawid (2007), to which we refer as properization. We
discuss examples from the recent literature and apply the construction to
create new types, and reinterpret existing forms, of proper scoring rules and
consistent scoring functions. In an abstract setting, we formulate sufficient
conditions under which Bayes acts exist and scoring rules can be made
proper.
Key words and phrases. Bayes act; consistent scoring function; forecast
evaluation; misclassification error; proper scoring rule.
1 Introduction
Let B be a σ-algebra of subsets of a general sample space Ω. Let P be a convex
class of probability measures on (Ω,B). A scoring rule is any extended real-valued
function S on P × Ω such that
S(P,Q) =
∫
S(P, ω) dQ(ω)
is well-defined for P,Q ∈ P . The scoring rule S is proper relative to P if
S(Q,Q) ≤ S(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ P . (1)
In words, we take scoring rules to be negatively oriented penalties that a forecaster
wishes to minimize. If she believes that a future quantity or event has distribution
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Q, and the penalty for quoting the predictive distribution P when ω realizes is
S(P, ω), then (1) implies that quoting P = Q is an optimal strategy in expectation.
The scoring rule is strictly proper if (1) holds with equality only if P = Q. For
recent reviews of the theory and application of proper scoring rules see Dawid
(2007), Gneiting and Raftery (2007), Dawid and Musio (2014), and Gneiting and
Katzfuss (2014).
The intent of this note is to draw attention to the simple fact that, subject to
customary regularity conditions, any scoring rule can be properized, in the sense
that it can be modified in a straightforward way to yield a proper scoring rule, so
that truth telling becomes an optimal strategy. Implicitly, this construction has
recently been used by various authors in various types of applications; see, e.g.,
Diks et al. (2011), Christensen et al. (2014) and Holzmann and Klar (2017).
Theorem 1 (properization). Let S be a scoring rule. Suppose that for every
P ∈ P there is a probability distribution P ∗ ∈ P such that
S(P ∗, P ) ≤ S(Q,P ) for all Q ∈ P . (2)
Then the function
S∗ : P × Ω→ R¯, (P, ω) 7→ S∗(P, ω) = S(P ∗, ω), (3)
is a proper scoring rule.
Here and in what follows we denote the real line by R and the extended real
line by R¯ := R ∪ {−∞,∞}. Any probability measure P ∗ with the property (2) is
commonly called Bayes act; for the existence of Bayes acts, see Section 3. In case
there are multiple minimizers of the expected score Q 7→ S(Q,P ), the function S∗
is well-defined by using a mapping P 7→ P ∗ that chooses a P ∗ out of the set of
minimizers. If S is proper and P ∗ = P , then S∗ = S, so the proper scoring rules
are fixed points under the properization operator.
Importantly, Theorem 1 is a special case of a general and powerful construction
studied in detail by Gru¨nwald and Dawid (2004) and Dawid (2007). Specifically,
given some action space A and a loss function L : A × Ω → R¯, suppose that for
each P ∈ P there is a Bayes act aP ∈ A, such that∫
L(aP , ω) dP (ω) ≤
∫
L(a, ω) dP (ω) for all a ∈ A.
Then the function
S∗ : P × Ω→ R¯, (P, ω) 7→ S∗(P, ω) = L(aP , ω),
is a proper scoring rule. Note the natural connection to decision- and utility-based
scoring approaches, where the quality of a forecast is judged by the monetary
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utility of the induced acts and decisions (Granger and Pesaran, 2000; Granger and
Machina, 2006; Ehm et al., 2016).
In the remainder of the paper we focus on the above special case in which the
action domain A is the class P . In Section 2 we identify scattered results in the
literature as prominent special cases of properization (Examples 1–4), and we use
Theorem 1 to construct new proper scoring rules from improper ones (Examples 5–
7). Section 3 gives sufficient conditions for the existence of Bayes acts and Section 4
contains a brief discussion. All proofs and technical details are moved to the
Appendix.
2 Examples
This section starts with an example in which we review the ubiquitous misclassifi-
cation error from the perspective of properization. We go on to demonstrate how
Theorem 1 has been used implicitly to construct proper scoring rules in economet-
ric, meteorological, and statistical strands of literature. The notion of properiza-
tion simplifies and shortens the respective proofs of propriety, makes them much
more transparent, and puts the scattered examples into a unifying and principled
joint framework. Further examples show other facets of properization: The scor-
ing rules constructed in Example 5 are original, and the discussion in Example 6
illustrates a connection to the practical problem of the treatment of observational
uncertainty in forecast evaluation. Finally, Example 7 includes an instance of a
situation in which properization fails.
Example 1. Consider probability forecasts of a binary event, where Ω = {0, 1}
and P is the class of the Bernoulli measures. We identify any P ∈ P with the
probability p = P ({1}) ∈ [0, 1] and consider the scoring rules
S1(P, ω) := 1− pω − (1− p)(1− ω) and S2(P, ω) := |p− ω|.
The scoring rule S1 corresponds to the mean probability rate (MPR) in machine
learning (Ferri et al., 2009, p. 30). The scoring rule S2 was first considered by
Dawid (1986). It agrees with the special case c1 = c2 in Section 4.2 of Parry
(2016) and corresponds to the mean absolute error (MAE) as discussed by Ferri
et al. (2009, p. 30).1 Both S1 and S2 are improper with common Bayes act
p∗ = 1(p ≥ 1
2
) ∈ {0, 1},
1As noted by Parry (2016), the improper score S2 shares its (concave) expected score function
P 7→ S2(P, P ) with the proper Brier score. This illustrates the importance of the second condition
in Theorem 1 of Gneiting and Raftery (2007): For a scoring rule S the (strict) concavity of the
expected score function G(P ) := S(P, P ) is equivalent to the (strict) propriety of S only if,
furthermore, −S(P, ·) is a subtangent of −G at P .
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and with the same properized score given by the zero-one rule
S∗(P, ω) =
{
0, p∗ = ω,
1, otherwise.
A case-averaged zero-one score is typically referred to as misclassification rate or
misclassification error; undoubtedly, this is the most popular and most frequently
used performance measure in binary classification. While the scoring rule S∗ is
proper it fails to be strictly proper (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007, Example 4; Parry,
2016, Section 4.3). Consequently, misclassification error has serious limitations as
a performance measure, as persuasively argued by Harrell (2015, p. 258), among
others. Nevertheless, the scoring rule S∗ is proper, contrary to recent claims of
impropriety in the blogosphere.2
For the remainder of the section, let Ω = R and let B be the Borel σ-algebra.
We let L be the class of Borel measures P with a Lebesgue density, p. Furthermore,
we write Pk for the measures with finite k-th moment and P+k for the subclasses
when Dirac measures are excluded. Whenever it simplifies notation, we identify
P with its cumulative distribution function x 7→ P ((−∞, x]).
Example 2. Let S0 be a proper scoring rule on some subclass P of L and let w be
a nonnegative weight function such that 0 <
∫
w(z) p(z) dz <∞ for p ∈ P . Let
S : P × R→ R, (P, y) 7→ S(P, y) = w(y) S0(P, y);
this score is improper unless the weight function is constant. Indeed, by Theorem 1
of Gneiting and Ranjan (2011), the Bayes act P ∗ under S has density
p∗(y) =
w(y) p(y)∫
w(z) p(z) dz
.
From this we see that the key statement in Theorem 1 of Holzmann and Klar
(2017) constitutes a special case of Theorem 1. In the further special case in
which S0 is the logarithmic score, the properized score (3) recovers the conditional
likelihood score of Diks et al. (2011) up to equivalence, as noted in Example 1 of
Holzmann and Klar (2017). For analogous results for consistent scoring functions
see Theorem 5 of Gneiting (2011) and Example 2 of Holzmann and Klar (2017).
Example 3. For a probability measure P ∈ P4, let µP , σ2P , and γP denote its
mean, variance, and centered third moment. Let
S(P, y) =
(
σ2P − (y − µP )2
)2
2See, e.g., http://www.fharrell.com/post/class-damage/ and http://www.fharrell.
com/post/classification/.
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be the ‘trial score’ in equation (16) of Christensen et al. (2014). As Christensen
et al. (2014) show in their Appendix A, any Bayes act P ∗ under S has mean
µP +
1
2
γP
σ2P
and variance
σ2P
(
1 +
1
4
γ2P
σ6P
)
,
so properization yields the spread-error score,
S∗(P, y) =
(
σ2P − (y − µP )2 + (y − µP )
γP
σ2P
)2
,
which is proper relative to the class P+4 . Hence the construction of the spread-error
score in Christensen et al. (2014) constitutes another special case of Theorem 1.
Example 4. The predictive model choice criterion of Laud and Ibrahim (1995)
and Gelfand and Ghosh (1998) uses the scoring rule S(P, y) = (y − µP )2 + σ2P ,
where µP and σ
2
P denote the mean and the variance of a distribution P ∈ P2,
respectively. As pointed out by Gneiting and Raftery (2007), this score fails to be
proper. Specifically, any Bayes act P ∗ under S has mean µP and vanishing variance,
so properization yields the ubiquitous squared error, S∗(P, y) = (y − µP )2.
The original scoring rules of Examples 3 and 4 can be interpreted as functions
S : A×Ω→ R in the Bayes act setting of Gru¨nwald and Dawid (2004) and Dawid
(2007), where the action space A is given by R× [0,∞). Hence, the properization
method can be interpreted as an application of Theorem 3 of Gneiting (2011) to
consistent scoring functions for elicitable two-dimensional functionals, as discussed
by Fissler and Ziegel (2016).
Detailed arguments and calculations for the subsequent examples are deferred
to the Appendix.
Example 5. For α > 0 consider the scoring rule
Sα(P, y) =
∫
|P (x)− 1(y ≤ x)|α dx,
where P is identified with its cumulative distribution function (CDF). For α = 2
this is the well known proper continuous ranked probability score (CRPS), as
reviewed in Section 4.2 of Gneiting and Raftery (2007). For α = 1 the score Sα
was proposed by Mu¨ller et al. (2005), and Zamo and Naveau (2018) show in their
Appendix A that for discrete distributions every Dirac measure in a median of P
is a Bayes act. The same holds true for general distributions and for all α ∈ (0, 1].
If α > 1, the Bayes act P ∗ under Sα is given by
P ∗(x) =
(
1 +
(
1− P (x)
P (x)
)1/(α−1))−1
1(P (x) > 0), (4)
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and all in all we see that properization of Sα works for any α > 0.
Moreover, in the case α > 1 the mapping P 7→ P ∗ is even injective. Conse-
quently, if the class P is such that P ∗ ∈ P and Sα(P ∗, P ) is finite for P ∈ P , the
properized score (3) is even strictly proper relative to P . If α ∈ (1, 2], this can
be ensured by restricting Sα to the class P1. For α > 2 the class Pc of the Borel
measures with compact support is a suitable choice.
Example 6. Friederichs and Thorarinsdottir (2012, p. 58) propose a modification
of the CRPS that aims to account for observational error in forecast evaluation.
Specifically, they consider the scoring rule
SΦ(P, y) =
∫
|P (x)− Φ(x− y)|2 dx,
where Φ ∈ P+1 represents additive observation error. This scoring rule fails to be
proper, as for probability measures P,Q ∈ P1 we have
SΦ(P,Q) = CRPS(P,Q ∗ Φ)− CRPS(Φ,Φ), (5)
where ∗ denotes the convolution operator. Due to the strict propriety of the CRPS
relative to the class P1, the unique Bayes act under SΦ is given by P ∗ = P ∗ Φ.
Theorem 1 now gives the scoring rule S(P, y) := SΦ(P
∗, y), which is proper relative
to P1.
In order to account for noisy observational data in forecast evaluation, equa-
tion (5) suggests using the scoring rule S(P, y) := CRPS(P ∗, y) if the noise is
independent, additive, and has distribution Φ. This corresponds to predicting hy-
pothetical true values, to which noise is added before they are compared to obser-
vations. The drawbacks of this approach and alternative techniques are discussed
by Ferro (2017). The associated issues in forecast evaluation remain challenges to
the scientific community at large; see, e.g., Ebert et al. (2013) and Ferro (2017).
Example 7. Let S be a scoring rule, and let Φ ∈ L be a distribution with Lebesgue
density ϕ. Suppose P is a class of distributions such that P ∗ Φ ∈ P for P ∈ P .
For P ∈ P define
Sϕ(P, y) :=
∫
ϕ(x− y) S(P, x) dx,
which is again a scoring rule. If S is proper, a Bayes act under Sϕ is given by
P ∗ = P ∗Φ, since Sϕ(P,Q) = S(P,Q∗Φ) for Q ∈ P , and if S is strictly proper, the
Bayes act is unique. Properization now gives the proper scoring rule S(P, y) :=
Sϕ(P ∗, y). An interesting special case emerges when substituting the CRPS for S.
This leads to
CRPSϕ(P, y) = SΦ(P, y) + CRPS(Φ,Φ), (6)
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where SΦ is the scoring rule in the previous example. For another special case, let
c > 0 and P ∈ L, to yield
PSc(P, y) := −
∫ y+c
y−c
p(x) dx,
which recovers the probability score of Wilson et al. (1999). We have that PSc =
2cLinSϕc , where LinS(P, y) := −p(y) is the improper linear score and ϕc is a
uniform density on [−c, c]. Properization is not feasible relative to sufficiently rich
classes P , as Bayes acts fail to exist under both the linear score and the probability
score. For details, see the Appendix.
3 Existence of Bayes acts
In Example 7 we presented a scoring rule that cannot be properized, due to the non-
existence of Bayes acts. This section addresses the question under which conditions
on S and P a minimum of the expected score function exists. To illustrate the
ideas, we start with a further example.
Example 8. Using the notation of Example 3, consider the normalized squared
error,
S(P, y) =
(y − µP )2
σ2P
,
as a scoring rule on the classes P2,m of the Borel measures with variance at most m,
and P2 = ∪m>0P2,m, respectively. Relative to P2,m any Bayes act P ∗ under S has
mean µP and variance m, so properization yields (non-normalized) squared error
up to equivalence. Relative to P2 however, there is no Bayes act, since increasing
the variance will always lead to a smaller expected score.
We now turn to a general perspective and discuss sufficient conditions for
the existence of Bayes acts. At first, consider a finite probability space Ω =
{ω1, . . . , ωk}. In this situation, geometrical arguments yield sufficient conditions.
In particular, a Bayes act under S exists if the risk set
S := {(x1, . . . , xk) | ∃P ∈ P : xj = S(P, ωj), j = 1, . . . , k} ⊂ Rk
is closed from below and bounded from below; see Theorem 1 in Chapter 2.5 of
Ferguson (1967). Extending this result to a general sample space Ω is non-trivial
since in this case S can be a subset of an infinite-dimensional vector space. In the
following we employ well-known concepts of functional analysis in order to discuss
two possible extensions. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
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Let P be a set of probability measures on a general probability space Ω and
let A be a topological space. We return to the setting of Section 1 and consider
functions S : A×Ω→ R. This makes the results more general and easier to apply
in situations where the scoring rule depends on P only via some finite number of
parameters. Concerning the latter point, note that the normalized squared error
of Example 8 can be written as a composition of the mapping P 7→ (µP , σ2P ) and
the function s(x1, x2, y) := (y − x1)2/x2, with s being defined on R× (0,∞)× R.
Consequently, the expected normalized squared error attains its minimum if the
expected score of s attains its minimum. Note that such a decomposition of the
scoring rule is possible for Examples 3 and 4 as well, as alluded to in the comments
that succeed these examples.
We impose the following integrability assumption on S.
Definition 1. The mapping S : A × Ω → R is uniformly bounded from below if
there exists a function g : Ω → R which is integrable with respect to any P ∈ P
and such that S(a, ·) ≥ g holds for all a ∈ A.
Our first result is similar to Theorem 2 in Chapter 2.9 of Ferguson (1967),
which proves the existence of minimax decision rules.
Theorem 2. Suppose S is lower semicontinuous in its first component and uni-
formly bounded from below. If A is compact, then the function a 7→ S(a, P ) attains
its minimum for any P ∈ P.
This theorem can be used to prove the existence of a Bayes act for a given
scoring rule. However, it is not applicable to Example 8. To see this, recall the de-
composition of S mentioned above and note that restricting S to P2,m corresponds
to restricting s to R × (0,m]. The latter set is not a compact space and neither
is its closure. Consequently, we aim to dispense with the compactness assumption
used in Theorem 2.
To do so, we need additional concepts from functional analysis. Let X be a
real normed vector space. Recall that a function h : X → R is called coercive if
for any sequence (xn)n∈N ⊂ X the implication
lim
n→∞
‖xn‖ =∞ ⇒ lim
n→∞
h(xn) =∞
holds true, see, e.g. Definition III.5.7 in Werner (2018). By weak topology on X ,
we mean the weakest topology such that all real-valued linear mappings on X
are continuous; see, e.g. Chapters 2.13 and 6.5 in Aliprantis and Border (2006).
The space X is called a reflexive Banach space if it is complete and the canonical
embedding of X into its bidual space is surjective; see, e.g. Chapter III.3 in Werner
(2018) or Chapter 6.3 in Aliprantis and Border (2006). Combining these concepts,
we obtain a complement to Theorem 2.
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Theorem 3. Let A be a weakly closed subset of a reflexive Banach space. More-
over, suppose S is weakly lower semicontinuous in its first component and uni-
formly bounded from below. If the function a 7→ S(a, P ) is coercive, then it attains
its minimum.
This result yields the existence of Bayes acts as long as the integrated scoring
rule is coercive for any P ∈ P , where P is a reflexive Banach space. To conclude
this section, we connect Theorem 3 to Example 8: The function s(·, ·, y) from the
decomposition of S mentioned above is defined on R × (0,∞), which is a subset
of the reflexive Banach space R2. Moreover, s is bounded from below by zero and
continuous in its first component. As mentioned above, restricting the class P2 to
P2,m corresponds to restricting the domain of s to R× (0,m] and in this situation,
integrating s with respect to y gives a coercive function. Consequently, Theorem 3
can be used to show that S can be properized if restricted to P2,m.
4 Discussion
In this article we have introduced the concept of properization, which is rooted in
the Bayes act construction of Gru¨nwald and Dawid (2004) and Dawid (2007), and
we have drawn attention to its widespread implicit use in the transdisciplinary
literature on proper scoring rules, where our unified approach yields simplified,
shorter, and considerably more instructive and transparent proofs than extant
methods. Moreover, using new examples, we have demonstrated the power of the
properization approach in the creation of new proper scoring rules from existing
improper ones.
Since the central element in the construction of a properized score is a Bayes act,
we have discussed conditions on the scoring rule S and the class P that guarantee
its existence. Undoubtedly, there are alternative paths to existence results in the
spirit of Theorems 2 and 3, and the derivation of sufficient conditions in alternative
situations is an interesting open problem. Furthermore, we have not explored
necessary conditions for the existence of Bayes acts in this work. Their derivation
and the refinement of sufficient conditions on S and P remain challenges that we
leave for future work.
Appendix: Proofs
Here we present detailed arguments for the technical claims in Examples 5, 6,
and 7 as well as the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
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Details for Example 5
We fix some distribution P and start with the case α > 1. An application of
Fubini’s theorem gives
Sα(Q,P ) =
∫ ∫
|Q(x)− 1(y ≤ x)|α dP (y) dx. (7)
Given x ∈ R we seek the value Q(x) ∈ [0, 1] that minimizes the inner integral
in (7). If x is such that P (x) ∈ {0, 1}, the equality 1(y ≤ x) = P (x) holds
for P -almost all y, hence Q(x) = P (x) is the unique minimizer. If x satisfies
P (x) ∈ (0, 1), define the function
gx,P (q) :=
∫
|q − 1(y ≤ x)|α dP (y) = (1− P (x))qα + P (x)(1− q)α,
which is strictly convex in q ∈ (0, 1) with derivative
g′x,P (q) = α(1− P (x))qα−1 − αP (x)(1− q)α−1
and a unique minimum at q = q∗x,P ∈ (0, 1). As a consequence, the minimizing
value Q(x) is given by
Q(x) = q∗x,P =
(
1 +
(
1− P (x)
P (x)
)1/(α−1))−1
.
The function Q defined by the minimizers Q(x), x ∈ R is a minimizer of Sα(·, P )
and if Sα(Q,P ) is finite, it is unique Lebesgue almost surely. Since α > 1 the
function Q has the properties of a distribution function and hence P ∗ defined by (4)
is a Bayes act for P . Moreover, equation (4) shows that the relation between P
and P ∗ is one-to-one.
It remains to be checked under which conditions the properization of Sα is
not only proper but strictly proper. The representation (4) along with two Tay-
lor expansions implies that P ∗ behaves like P 1/(α−1) in the tails. This has two
consequences. At first, the above arguments show that for Sα(P
∗, P ) to be finite
x 7→ gx,P (P ∗(x)) has to be integrable with respect to Lebesgue measure. Hence,
the tail behavior of P ∗ and the inequality α/(α − 1) > 1 for α > 1 show that
Sα(P
∗, P ) is finite for P ∈ P1. Second, P ∗ has a lighter tail than P for α ∈ (1, 2)
and a heavier tail for α > 2. In the latter case P ∈ P1 does not necessarily imply
P ∗ ∈ P1. Hence, without additional assumptions, strict propriety of the proper-
ized score (3) can only be ensured relative to Pc for α > 2 and relative to the class
P1 for α ∈ (1, 2].
We now turn to α ∈ (0, 1). In this case, the function gx,P is strictly concave,
and its unique minimum is at q = 0 for P (x) < 1
2
and at q = 1 for P (x) > 1
2
. If
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P (x) = 1
2
, then both 0 and 1 are minima. Arguing as above, every Bayes act P ∗
is a Dirac measure in a median of P .
Finally, α = 1 implies that gx,P is linear, thus, as for α ∈ (0, 1), every Dirac
measure in a median of P is a Bayes rule. The only difference to the case α ∈ (0, 1)
is that if there is more than one median, there are Bayes acts other than Dirac
measures, since gx,P is constant for all x satisfying P (x) =
1
2
.
Details for Example 6
Let P,Q and Φ be distribution functions. By the definition of the convolution
operator ∫
1(y ≤ x) d(Q ∗ Φ)(y) =
∫
Φ(x− y) dQ(y)
holds for x ∈ R. Using this identity and Fubini’s theorem leads to
SΦ(P,Q) =
∫ ∫ (
P (x)2 − 2P (x)Φ(x− y) + Φ(x− y)2) dQ(y) dx
=
∫ ∫ (
P (x)2 − 2P (x)1(y ≤ x) + 1(y ≤ x)) d(Q ∗ Φ)(y) dx
+
∫ ∫
Φ(x− y)(Φ(x− y)− 1) dQ(y) dx
=
∫ ∫
(P (x)− 1(y ≤ x))2 dx d(Q ∗ Φ)(y)−
∫
Φ(x)(1− Φ(x)) dx,
which verifies equality in (5). Moreover, the strict propriety of the CRPS relative
to the class P1 gives SΦ(P,Q) < ∞ for P,Q,Φ ∈ P1, thereby demonstrating that
the Bayes act is unique in this situation.
Details for Example 7
For distributions P,Q ∈ P and c > 0, the Fubini-Tonelli theorem and the definition
of the convolution operator give
Sϕ(P,Q) = −
∫ ∫
ϕ(x− y)S(P, x) dQ(y) dx
=
∫ ∫
ϕ(x− y) dQ(y) S(P, x) dx = S(P,Q ∗ Φ),
so the stated (unique) Bayes act under Sϕ follows from the (strict) propriety of S.
Proceeding as in the details for Example 6 we verify identity (6).
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For P ∈ L the same calculations as above show that the probability score
satisfies
PSc(P,Q) = 2c
∫
Q(x+ c)−Q(x− c)
2c
LinS(P, x) dx,
where LinS(P, y) = −p(y) is the linear score. Consequently, to demonstrate that
Theorem 1 is neither applicable to PSc nor to LinS, it suffices to show that there
is a distribution Q such that P 7→ LinS(P,Q) does not have a minimizer. We
use an argument that generalizes the construction in Section 4.1 of Gneiting and
Raftery (2007) who show that LinS is improper. Let q be a density, symmetric
around zero and strictly increasing on (−∞, 0). Let  > 0 and define the interval
Ik := ((2k− 1), (2k+ 1)] for k ∈ Z. Suppose p is a density with positive mass on
some interval Ik for k 6= 0. Due to the properties of q, the score LinS(P,Q) can
be reduced by substituting the density defined by
p˜(x) := p(x)− 1(x ∈ Ik) p(x) + 1(x+ 2k ∈ Ik) p(x+ 2k)
for p, i.e., by shifting all probability mass from Ik to the modal interval I0. Re-
peating this argument for any  > 0 shows that no density p can be a minimizer of
the expected score LinS(P,Q). Note that the assumptions on q are stronger than
necessary in order to facilitate the argument. They can be relaxed at the cost of
a more elaborate proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let (an)n∈N ⊂ A be a sequence with a := limn→∞ an. Since S is lower semicon-
tinuous in its first component and uniformly bounded from below by g, Fatou’s
lemma gives
lim inf
n→∞
∫
S(an, ω) dP (ω) ≥
∫
lim inf
n→∞
S(an, ω) dP (ω) ≥ S(a, P )
for any P ∈ P . Hence, a 7→ S(a, P ) is a lower semicontinuous function for any
P ∈ P and due to the assumed compactness of A, the result now follows from
Theorem 2.43 in Aliprantis and Border (2006).
Proof of Theorem 3
The same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2 show that a 7→ S(a, P ) is a
weakly lower semicontinuous function for any P ∈ P . If P ∈ P is such that this
function is also coercive, then proceeding as in the proof of Satz III.5.8 in Werner
(2018) gives a weakly convergent sequence (an)n∈N ⊂ A with limn→∞ S(an, P ) =
infa∈A S(a, P ). Since A is weakly closed by assumption, it contains the weak
limit a∗ of the sequence (an)n∈N and hence weak lower semicontinuity implies that
a 7→ S(a, P ) attains its minimum at a∗ ∈ A.
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